Pertinent here is what Husserl had to say about language and expression (LI, I) and about intentionality itself (LI, V & VI). Throughout its existence the company has been honored with many awards which recognise BRILL's contribution to science, publishing and international trade. Ayer were critical of Husserl's concept of intentionality and his many layers of consciousness. The structure that governs the relationship between the subject and the object of consciousness is referred to as "intentionality. The notions of empty and fulfilled intentions in conjunction with Husserl’s understanding of the noematic horizon and of systems of possible interrelated object-experiences allow him to continue the epistemological investigations begun earlier in the Sixth Logical Investigation along two major lines. It is intentional awareness of such facts that forms the basis of categorial judgments, and the intentional contents of categorial acts can be understood along the lines of propositions, the relations among and analysis of which is the subject matter of logic. Influenced in various ways by Aristotle’s psychology, by the medieval notion of the intentio of a thought, and by modern philosophical views such as those of Descartes and the empiricists, he identifies intentionality as the mark or distinctive characteristic of the mental. In Logical Investigations Husserl developed a view according to which conscious acts are primarily intentional, and a mental act is intentional only in case it has an act-quality and an act-matter. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Føllesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. Second, assuming the interlocutor grasps that this is what is being expressed, her attention will itself be directed to the referent of this ideal sense, namely the state of affairs involving the weather today (her act-matter will then also instantiate the relevant ideal act-matter species). Here, the “point of unity” is the underlying core of intended object identity “X”, the “object in the How of its determinations” is the descriptive content or sense, and the “undeterminednesses” constitute the horizon of the current content. Important here is that the notions of intentionality and intentional content remain central to Husserl’s project and so many of the descriptions and results of the Investigations remain relevant for the Ideas. CONSCIOUSNESS IN PHENOMENOLOGY For Edmund Husserl, the two basic features of consciousness are intentionality and temporality. While every such mental phenomenon has an object, different mental phenomena relate to their objects in different ways depending on whether they are mental acts of presenting something, of judging about something, or of evaluating something as good or bad. Given the pervasive role he takes intentionality to play in all thought and experience, Husserl believes that a systematic theory of intentionality has a role to play in clarifying and founding most other areas of philosophical concern, such as the theory of consciousness, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, epistemology, and the philosophies of action and value. This latter being a way of saying that Jack directed his mind toward the bird by thinking of it or perceiving it as a blue jay. As Husserl puts it, using ‘perfect givenness’ to suggest the ideally possible experience of having gone through all of the possible correct intentions with regard to a given object: But perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated as “Idea” (in the Kantian sense)—as a system which, in its eidetic type, is an absolutely determined system of endless processes of continuous appearings, or as a field of these processes, an a priori determined continuum of appearances with different, but determined, dimensions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws…This continuum is determined more precisely as infinite on all sides, consisting of appearances in all its phases of the same determinable X so ordered in its concatenations and so determined with respect to the essential contents that any of its lines yields, in its continuous course, a harmonious concatenation (which itself is to be designated as a unity of mobile appearances) in which the X, given always as one and the same, is more precisely and never “otherwise” continuously-harmoniously determined. The next two sub-sections deal with act-character and act-matter respectively. Husserl is interested in analyzing the meaning and reference of language as part of his project of developing a pure logic. To distinguish such ‘contents’ from other notions of ‘content’ we shall speak here of the matter (material) of judgment. “The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction.”. This text also includes a number of contributions concerning the correct interpretation of the noema. We are equipped with intentional consciousness. Request Permissions. Largely motivated by his concern with developing a pure logic, Husserl devotes the entire first Logical Investigation, “Meaning and Expression”, to an analysis of issues of language, linguistic meaning and linguistic reference. At each step the subject integrates her current experience with the previous one, identifying the X at the core of the current experience with the X at the core of the previous ones, and is at the same time directed toward new possible ways of filling out her experience of the barn in the horizon of the noema (for example by walking around it some more, or by going inside); Husserl refers to this process as a “synthesis of identity”. According to Husserl, essentially occasional expressions include both indexicals (‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and so forth) and demonstratives (‘this’, ‘that’ , and so forth). Metaphysically the main change is that Husserl seems to abandon the model of meanings as ideal species that get instantiated in the act-matters of particular subjects in favor of a more direct correlative relationship between the noesis (intentional acts) and the noemata (their objects). It involves focusing on a kind of object, such as a triangle, and systematically varying features of that object, reflecting at each step on whether the object being reflected upon remains, in spite of its altered feature(s), an instance of the kind under consideration. Husserl’s understanding of the noema in the Ideas retains the explanatory features (in terms of theory of language and its ability to resolves puzzles about meaningful reference to the non-existent, informative identity statements, and so forth) of Logical Investigations account while also incorporating a more nuanced analysis of the structure of intentional content itself and a more holistic understanding of how the intentional content (noema) that a subject is thinking at a given moment is interconnected with other features of that subject’s actual and possible experience (the systems of noemata). Phenomenology, as Husserl understood it in 1900 in the first edition of the Logical Investigations,[xxx] is an elaboration of “descriptive psychology” in Brentano’s sense. Here the main features of Husserl’s intentionality-based view of language are discussed. Itslooking to you as … So the act-matter both determines to what object, if any, a thought refers, and determines how the thought presents that object as being. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. Because of this Husserl views meanings in the Investigations as “ideal species”, a kind of abstract entity akin to a universal. “Noema and Meaning in Husserl.”. A classic anthology collecting essays on the relationship of Husserl’s philosophy to cognitive science. This act-matter instantiates an ideal species or act-matter type “the weather is cool today” and in virtue of doing so directs the utterer’s attention to the actual state of affairs regarding the weather. 5-19: preuzimanja: 392* citiraj: APA 6th Edition Laasik, K. (2016). Hence, the question of dispute between Husserl and Brentano could be formulated as follows: are we The intentional content or noema of this experience will provide immediate awareness of one side or profile of the barn, perhaps intended as a barn, or perhaps just intended as a structure of some sort. No attempt will be made to resolve this interpretative dispute here, though it is worth noting that the question of the metaphysical status of the noesis, the noema, and the intentional object (if indeed this is to be viewed as a distinct entity in Husserl’s ontology) is in part complicated by Husserl’s methodological procedure of bracketing questions of existence. Widely(but not universally) accepted examples would include sensory states,imagery, episodic thought, and emotions of the sort we commonly enjoy.For instance, when you see something red, it looks somehow toyou; when you hear a crash, it sounds somehow to you. In the Investigations Husserl retains an understanding of the “act-character” of an intentional event as being its quality of positing or not positing the existence of its object and of being evidentially empty or fulfilled. Referring to these characters as “modalities” of belief (“doxic” modalities) and experience, Husserl recognizes both the already identified modalities pertaining to beliefs and also additional “ontic” modalities pertaining to whether a subject takes the content of their intention to be necessary or merely possible, valuable or worthless, beautiful or ugly. As noted above, Husserl takes the intentionality of thought to be fundamental and the meaning-expressing and reference fixing capabilities of language to be parasitic on more basic features of intentionality. [Cited in the text as: LI, Investigation # (I, II, etc.) In his early work, including Ideas, Husserl defends a strong realist position—that is, the things that are perceived by consciousness are assumed to be not only objects of consciousness but also the things themselves. Drummond, John. Husserl's theory of consciousness in the fifth of his Logical Inves-tigations is at the same time one of the most profound and one of the most difficult theories of consciousness to have as yet been devel- oped. It is important to note, however, that for Husserl intentional content is not essentially linguistic. meaning of intentionality in Husserl, particularly the infinite nature of Adumbration and the paradox of the model of “noesis-noema”. So the intentional state of seeing a white dog can be analyzed in terms of its intentional act, visually perceiving, and in terms of its intentional object, a white dog. Perry, John. (Ideas, § 131, p. 314). The barn, as an object of perception, transcends the information that can be given regarding it, the intention of it that can be made via any given noema, and this fact is a feature that is already intended in the very first thought a subject has about the barn. Request PDF | On Jan 1, 2018, Carlo Ierna published Intentionality and Consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate Husserl’s exact understanding of the ontological situation regarding intentional objects is quite involved and undergoes some changes between Logical Investigations and his later phenomenology, beginning with Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Thus Husserl, like Frege, distinguishes the meaning of a term or expression both from that term itself and from the object or objects to which the term refers. The first is what Husserl calls a constant “semantic function” associated with particular indexical expressions. Publications are increasingly becoming available in electronic format (CD-ROM and/or online editions).BRILL is proud to work with a broad range of scholars and authors and to serve its many customers throughout the world. Essays on various aspects of Husserl’s philosophy, including intentionality. Finally, the paper will stress on the significance of the absoluteness of consciousness in Sartre’s theory. The question of whether or not this account is adequate to resolve all of the issues raised by contemporary discussions of indexicals and demonstratives, however, is one that goes beyond the scope of this article (for discussion of this issue in Husserl’s philosophy see Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. In the Investigations, act-character includes such things as whether the intentional act is merely one of reflecting on a possibility (a “non-positing act”) or one of judging or asserting that something is the case (a “positing act”), as well as the degree of evidence that is available to support the intention of the act as fulfilled or unfulfilled (as genuinely presenting some object in just the way that the act-matter suggests, or not). For any intentional mental event it would make no sense to speak of it as involving an act without an intentional object any more than it would to say that the event involved an intentional object but no act or way of attending to that object (no intentional act). Sartre’s account captures an important aspect of Husserl’s theory of intentionality by insisting upon the essential nature of intentionality: consciousness is always a consciousness of an object, be it a real transcendent object, a memory or an emotion. In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. This leads him to focus primarily on declarative sentences from ordinary language, rather than on other kinds of potentially meaningful signs (such as the way in which smoke normally indicates or is a sign of fire) and gestures (such as the way in which a grimace might indicate or convey that someone feels pain or is uncomfortable). It is to reflect the remarkable achievements that have been made in Chinese universities in philosophy research. Thus, while it would be normal to say that “Jack intended to score a point when he kicked the ball toward the goal”, in the sense of ‘intention’ pertinent to Husserl it is equally correct to say that “Jack intended the bird as a blue jay”. Thus the bulk of a work that is intended to lay the foundations for a theory of logic as a priori, necessary, and completely independent of the composition or activities of the mind is devoted precisely to systematic investigations into the way in which language, meaning, thought, and knowledge are intentionally structured by the mind. It seems clear that the character of an act is ultimately traceable to the act-quality, since it has to do with the way in which an act-matter is thought about rather than with what that act-matter itself presents. What is common to each of these cases is that it seems possible to have meaningful experiences, thoughts and beliefs about these things even though the corresponding objects do not exist, at least not in any ordinary sense of ‘exist’. The primary project of the Investigations is to criticize a view in the philosophy of logic called “psychologism” according to which the laws of logic are in some sense natural laws or rules governing the human mind an… Here what is at issue is the extent to which a subject has evidence of some sort for accepting the content of their intention. T… To speak of the “intentional content” of a thought is to speak of the mode or way in which a thought is about an object. A subject who has performed the epoché and adopted the phenomenological attitude is in a position to objectively describe the features of her experience as she experiences them, the phenomena. The primary project of the Investigations is to criticize a view in the philosophy of logic called “psychologism” according to which the laws of logic are in some sense natural laws or rules governing the human mind and can thus be studied empirically by psychology. As mentioned already, such constitution analyses include analysis of the constitution of time-consciousness, the constitution of mathematical object awareness, the constitution of bodily awareness, the constitution (subjective and inter-subjective) of the social world, and so forth. Classic articles on the semantics of indexicals and demonstratives. Husserl attempts to give a descriptive account of consciousness in terms of a sensation, an intentional act that interprets the sensa-tion, and an intentional object that is … Husserl does not simply change his terminology, however. Thus if John and Sarah are both thinking about how they would like to see the Twins win the 2008 World Series in baseball, they are having the same thought and thinking about the same objects in virtue of instantiating exactly similar act-matter instances of the single act-matter species “the Twins win the 2008 World series in baseball” (LI, I §§ 30—4, V §§ 21 & 45). A comprehensive discussion of Husserl’s Phenomenology, including issues of intentionality and intentional content. The subject performing the utterance does, in principle, three things for his interlocutor. Husserl thus uses ‘expression’ to refer to declarative sentences in natural language and to parts thereof, such as names, general nouns, indexicals,and so forth (LI, I §§ 1—5). 1960, “On the Theory of Objects,” in Roderick Chisholm (ed.). JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization helping the academic community use digital technologies to preserve the scholarly record and to advance research and teaching in sustainable ways. Thus the “indicating meaning” of ‘I’ is always “whoever is now speaking”, but the indicated meaning of its use on a given occasion is keyed to the “self-awareness” or “self-presentation” of the speaker on that occasion. Hopefully they serve, however, to provide some sense of the interconnection between Husserl’s views concerning intentionality and the other parts of his philosophy. Husserl’s discussion here is systematic and wide ranging, covering many issues that are also of concern to Frege in his analysis of language and that have continued to spur discussion in the philosophy of language up to the present. The foregoing considerations go beyond the scope of what would normally be considered a discussion of Husserl’s views specifically on intentionality and intentional content. However, Husserl does both modify and expand his views about intentionality, as well as the kinds of analyses of it that he pursues. The subject could then go on to have further perceptual intentions of the barn by walking around it. The basic idea, however, can be stated without too much difficulty. Husserl first distinguishes between a component of sense or descriptive content on the one hand (accounting for the mode of presentation or description under which the object is intended), and a core component standing for or presenting the very identity of the object intended, a sort of pure “X” as Husserl calls it, underlying the various contents or noemata that are correlated with a single object of thought. He maintains that in normal cases what a subject intimates in uttering an expression (that he believes that the weather is cool today or that he fears that his country will intervene) is not part of the meaning of that expression, even though it is something that the interlocutor will be able to understand on the basis of the subject’s utterance. In the first part of the Investigations, the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”, Husserl systematically criticizes the psychologistic view and proposes to replace it with his own conception of “pure logic” as the a priori framework for organizing, understanding and validating the results of the formal, natural and social sciences (Husserl called the “theory of scientific theory in general” that pure logic was to be the foundation for ‘Wissenschaftslehre’). This would be the first noema intending the very object X, the barn perceptually before one, as red. “Husserl’s Noema and the Internalism-Externalism Debate.”. As noted above, the matter of an intentional act is its content: the way in which it presents the intentional object as being. The journal especially encourages papers related to classical Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy and puts special emphasis on exploring the philosophical thoughts of the prominent Chinese philosophers since the period of "Hundred Schools of Thought". Rather, it is experienced as a three dimensional object possessing other sides, parts and properties, and capable of being explored, investigated and determined, in short intended with regard to each of these further features. INTENTIONALITY Intentionality is a central concept in philosophy of mind and in Husserl’s phenom­ enology. An analysis of Husserl’s views on intentionality that situates them in their historical context with other members of the Brentano School and attempts to shed some light on the motivations for different interpretations of the noema or intentional content. consciousness, intentionality is the basis of our “relatedness” to the natural world. For Husserl, the matter of an intentional act does not consist of only linguistic descriptive content. Husserl, notably in agreement with Frege, believed that this view had the undesirable consequences of treating the laws of logic as contingent rather than necessarily true and as being empirically discoverable rather than as known and validated a priori. The concept of intentionality, the directedness of the consciousness toward an object, which is a basic concept in phenomenology, was already present in Brentano’s Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (1874; Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint): “And thus we can define psychic phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which, precisely as … Read your article online and download the PDF from your email or your account. Distinct from the phenomenological reduction, but important for the project of Husserl’s Phenomenology as a whole, is what is sometimes called the “eidetic reduction”. A discussion of the relationship between Husserl’s Phenomenology and the semantic internalism-externalism debate, the article also includes discussion of the main differences between competing interpretations of the noema within Husserl scholarship. section # (§), and, where quotes are used, page #]. Intentionality means that all consciousness is directed to some object. The purpose of the epoché is not to doubt or reject this thesis, but simply to set it aside or put it out of play so that the subject engaging in phenomenological investigation can reorient the focus of her attention to her experiences qua experiences and just as they are experienced. 194—226). “Husserl’s Notion of Noema” in Dreyfus (ed.) Husserl views act-quality, act-matter and act-character as mutually dependent constituents of a concrete particular thought. Frontiers of Philosophy in China One change between the Investigations and the Ideas is that Husserl began using the term ‘noesis’ to refer to intentional acts or “act-quality” and ‘noema’ (plural ‘noemata’) to refer to what, in the Investigations had been referred to as “act-matter”. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like … Thus, it is possible to distinguish, phenomenologically speaking, between the way in which the object is intended via a particular noema or sense, and the seemingly transcendent self-identical object that is intended, and which is the ultimate determinant of the accuracy or inaccuracy, truth or falsity of the intentions that are directed toward it. Ryle insisted that perceiving is not a process, [9] and Ayer that describing one's knowledge is not … Gurwitsch, Aron. Cases such as this both motivate the distinction between intentional content and intentional object and can be explained in terms of it. The selected essays have two remarkable characteristics: one is to approach traditional Chinese schools of philosophy with modern methods; the other is to discuss Western or other Asian schools of philosophy from Chinese perspectives. For this reason characterizations of intentional content in terms of “descriptive content” have their limits in the context of Husserl’s thought. When a subject thinks about the identity statement asserting that Mark Twain is Mark Twain, the subject thinks about Mark Twain in the same way (using the same intentional content; perhaps “the author of Huckleberry Finn”) in association with the name on both the left and right sides of the identity, whereas when a subject thinks about the identity statement asserting that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens what he learns is that different intentional contents (those associated with the names ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ respectively) are true of the same intentional object. Basically, Husserl was claiming that everything we know, even if what we know is true, is nonetheless something like an idea in the mind (e.g., My cat is now sitting on my computer as I … It is a matter of some controversy to what extent and in what way intentional content is truly distinct from the intentional object in Husserl’s writings. Check out using a credit card or bank account with. Of particular importance for Husserl in this connection is the notion of “categorial intuition”. The phenomenological reduction involves performing what Husserl calls the epoché, which is carried out by “bracketing”, setting in abeyance, or “neutralizing” the existential thesis of the “natural attitude”. Føllesdal’s articles are considered the classic statement of the “Fregean” interpretation of the noema. Edmund Husserl (1859—1938) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. Husserl’s philosophy is also being discussed in connection with contemporary research in the cognitive sciences, logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind, as well as in discussions of collective intentionality. It would be impossible to judge that something is (or is not the case) without a prior act familiarizing one with its existence or possibility in the first place. Other 20th-century philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle and A.J. BRILL is renowned for its publications in the following subject areas; Asian Studies, Ancient Near East & Egypt, Biblical Studies & Religious Studies, Classical Studies, Medieval & Early Modern Studies, Middle East & Islamic Studies. No referent, among other things, concerned to identify a second facet or of. Section clarifies these three notions based on Husserl ’ s understanding of the intention husserl intentionality of consciousness. 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